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Abstract This paper examines theoretically and empirically how employment
protection legislation affects location decisions of multinationals. We depart from
the ‘‘conventional wisdom’’ by examining not only the effect of protection on
inward foreign direct investment (FDI), but also a country’s ability to ‘‘anchor’’
potential outward investment. Based on our simple theoretical framework, we
estimate an empirical model, using data on bilateral FDI and employment protection
indices for OECD countries, and controlling for other labour market institutions and
investment costs. We find that, while an ‘‘unfavourable’’ employment protection
differential between a domestic and a foreign location is inimical to FDI, a high
domestic level of employment protection tends to discourage outward FDI. The
results are in line with our conjecture that strict employment protection in the firm’s
home country makes firms reluctant to relocate abroad and keeps them ‘‘anchored’’
at home.
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1 Introduction
The increasing degree of economic integration and the liberalisation of foreign
direct investment (FDI) policies worldwide have brought the determinants of the
location of economic activity to the forefront of debates in policy circles and the
popular press. Governments’ concerns focus increasingly on their ability to attract
and/or retain industries, an issue whose relevance is mirrored by the discussion in
the recent article ‘‘Another week, another firm quits the UK’’ published in the British
newspaper The Observer.1
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potentially complex effects of
labour market flexibility (or the lack of it) on the location of economic activity.
Labour market laws and institutions are commonly regarded as crucial in
determining the relative attractiveness of locations to internationally mobile firms,
particularly if (as in the case of employment protection measures and redundancy
payments) they affect the flexibility with which firms can adjust output and
employment to evolving economic conditions. As a result, governments increas-
ingly see labour market regulations as viable policy instruments in trying to
influence the location decision of footloose firms. These measures, however, give
rise to a policy trade-off for governments. On the one hand, by restricting firms’ exit
options, employment protection laws may deter inward FDI (e.g. Go¨rg 2005;
Haaland et al. 2003). This effect is reflected in the commonly held view that the
substantial differences that exist between economies (even within the European
Union) in labour market restrictions represent a source of unfair ‘competitive
advantage’ for those locations with lower costs of employment adjustments. On the
other hand, this type of labour market rigidities may help governments in locking in
(domestic and foreign) firms, thus reducing outward investment aimed at
substituting foreign for domestic employment.
Although a substantial amount of work exists on the impact of employment
legislation on employment,2 little research has been done on the relationship between
the former and the location of industry. Moreover, to our knowledge, the limited body
of articles that addresses this relationship fails to capture the complexity of the effects
of employment protection on industry location because it focuses on the role of
employment protection in undermining a location’s ability to attract new footloose
industries, without considering its role in discouraging firms’ (re)location abroad.
Haaland and Wooton (2002) and Haaland et al. (2003) provide theoretical analyses
that formalise the detrimental effect of employment protection on inward FDI. This
1 This quotes a chairman of a regional development agency in the UK as saying that ‘‘The big market
now is in the retention of the investment business that is here’’. The Observer, ‘‘Another week, another
firm quits the UK’’, by Oliver Morgan, 1 June 2003.
2 Hiring and firing restrictions are typically not found to have a decisive role on overall rates of
unemployment (e.g. Nickell 1998; Nickell et al. 2001), but are shown to reduce job reallocation rates and
employment variation over the business cycle—e.g. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Garibaldi et al.
(1997).
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result is supported empirically by Go¨rg (2005) who finds that host countries’ firing
costs are negatively related to inward FDI from the US, Nicoletti et al. (2003) who
find that employment protection reduces FDI in OECD countries, and Javorcik and
Spatareanu (2005) who find that labour market flexibility is positively associated with
inward FDI in some Western and Eastern European countries. Dewit et al. (2003)
argue that the relationship between labour market flexibility and FDI is more subtle.
Their analysis suggests that employment protection may not necessarily hinder a
country’s ability to retain (and under certain conditions even attract) economic
activity; since inflexibility implies commitment power, firms may prefer an inflexible
location over a flexible one, even in an uncertain environment.
In this paper we enrich the existing literature by arguing that employment
protection also has a ‘domestic anchorage’ effect because it affects a country’s
ability to retain their existing industrial base. Allowing for this effect has
implications for the specification of empirical models of FDI which have not been
taken into account in the literature to-date.
We use a simple theoretical model to examine how employment protection
regulations affect the location and relocation decisions of a monopolist when
alternative locations characterised by different degrees of employment protection are
possible. We then test empirically the predictions of the model using panel data on
bilateral FDI stocks and employment protection indices for OECD countries. The data
also allow us to control for other aspects of labour market institutions, in particular the
degree of unionisation of the labour market, the wage bargaining system, and
investment costs. Our empirical analysis supports our conjecture that employment
protection laws are likely to have different effects on firms’ location decisions: whilst
an ‘unfavourable’ employment protection differential between a domestic and a
foreign location is inimical to inward FDI, a high domestic level of employment
protection tends to discourage outward FDI. In other words, lay-off costs in their home
country makes firms reluctant to relocate abroad and keeps them ‘anchored’ at home.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. A simple theoretical model is
developed in Sect. 2. The empirical analysis is carried out in Sect. 3 and Sect. 4
concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we explore theoretically how differences in employment protection
regulations between countries affect the location and relocation decisions of a firm
operating in an uncertain environment when alternative locations are possible. To
this end, we develop a simple two-period four-stage model that allows for the
endogenous determination of both the initial location and the potential relocation
choice of a monopolist choosing between two countries characterised by different
levels of employment protection.3 Since the purpose of this model is not to offer a
3 The monopoly assumption is similar to the one in the model by Haaland et al. (2003). We make this
assumption for simplicity as the main purpose of the model is to motivate our empirical analysis. For a
theoretical analysis of the ‘attraction versus retention’ effects of employment protection in strategic
settings, see Dewit et al. (2003).
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fully developed theory of FDI in the presence of employment protection, we omit
from the theoretical analysis all other factors (e.g. market size) that might affect FDI
decisions.
We focus on the location decision of a monopolist over two periods (t = 1, 2). In
period one, the monopolist chooses the initial location for its investment between
two countries which we shall refer to as ‘home’ (h) and ‘foreign’ (f). These locations
are assumed to represent an integrated market.4 In period two, the firm will decide
whether to remain in the initial location or to relocate.
The firm knows period one demand but faces uncertainty about future demand;
this uncertainty is resolved at the start of period two. Demand in period one (t = 1)
is given by p1 = a - bq1. To keep matters simple, we assume that there are only
two possible states for period-two demand: with a given probability q, demand in
t = 2 is the same as in t = 1; with the complementary probability 1 - q, period-
two demand will boom, i.e. p2 = a - bq2 ? e with e[ 0 (note that e is not a
random variable, but simply a constant parameter, representing a positive demand
shock). As will become clear, in our model a firm that initially located in home will
not want to relocate to foreign if period two demand falls; hence, to keep our
analysis as concise as possible we do not focus on this case in the main body of the
paper but we allow for the possibility of a negative demand shock in an extended
version of the model in the Appendix.5
Since future demand is uncertain, the firm values flexibility. However, flexibility
may be hindered by employment protection regulations. We shall assume that the
two countries differ in labour market institutions, with country h having tighter
employment protection regulations in place than country f.
The firm’s costs depend on where its production takes place. The marginal costs
of production in the two locations are constant and denoted by ch and cf. When
setting up a plant, a fixed cost of Uh and Uf, respectively, is incurred. Differences in
fixed cost may, among other things, reflect the fact that when locating abroad a firm
will typically incur additional FDI costs. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the
fixed cost in f will be higher than in h—i.e. Uf [Uh, with the difference (Uf - Uh)
reflecting the cost of FDI.6 In the presence of employment protection in the
production location, redundancy payments will be incurred when a firm’s
production level in period two drops below the level in the previous period. In
other words, employment protection costs are given by kiðqi1  qi2Þ if qi1 [ qi2
(i = h, f), where the subscripts refer to the time period and ki is a constant denoting
the degree of employment protection in country i. For simplicity, we shall assume
4 These assumptions allow us to focus on the effect of employment protection on location choice, while
abstracting from other location determinants, such as market access and other aspects of labour market
institutions whose importance for firms’ location decisions is well understood. See, for instance,
Markusen (2002) and Leahy and Montagna (2000a).
5 As shown in the Appendix, the qualitative conclusions from our analysis remain unaltered. The only
difference is that, with the possibility of a negative demand shock in period two, the attractiveness of
home as the firm’s initial location is further reduced.
6 Clearly, the two countries could be taken to represent two generic locations considered by a firm with
headquarters in a third country. In this instance, Uf [Uh simply captures that the FDI costs for country f
are higher than those for country h.
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that the employment protection differential between h and f is kh - kf = kh, i.e.
kf = 0.
The firm’s decision sequence is as follows. In period one, the firm chooses a
location (stage 1) and subsequently determines its production level (stage 2). In
period two, when uncertainty is resolved, the firm considers whether is should
relocate (stage 3) and then chooses its output level for that period (stage 4). The
firm’s location and relocation choices give rise to four possible intertemporal
location patterns: the firm initially produces in ‘home’ and either stays there (h1, h2)
or relocates to ‘foreign’ (h1, f2), or, the firm initially produces in ‘foreign’ and either
stays there in the next period (f1, f2) or relocates to ‘home’ (f1, h2); subscripts 1 and
2, respectively, refer to the production location in period 1 and 2.
In order to investigate how employment protection affects a firm’s possible
relocation, the candidate equilibrium of special interest is (h1, f2), in which the firm
relocates to the region without employment protection, after having chosen the
region with employment protection as its initial production location. It is this
equilibrium which we will focus on henceforth.7 In particular, we want to examine
the conditions under which (h1, f2) is an equilibrium.
The first condition, which will be discussed in Sect. 2.1, requires that the firm’s
period two profits need to be higher when relocating to ‘foreign’ than when staying
in ‘home’, given that the firm chooses to locate in ‘home’ in period one, i.e. p2(h1,
f2) [ p2(h1, h2). Naturally, given that relocation is costly, especially when it
involves redundancy payments, if the firm was to know with certainty in t = 1 that
it would wish to relocate in t = 2, it would have chosen ‘foreign’ instead of ‘home’
as its initial location. Therefore, relocation to ‘foreign’ is probabilistic in our model.
So, when the firm decides to locate in ‘home’ in period one—in spite of the fact that
it may relocate to ‘foreign’ in period two—it does so because its expected profits
from choosing ‘home’ as its initial location exceed its expected profits from
choosing ‘foreign’ as its initial location. In other words, the second condition for
(h1, f2) to emerge as an equilibrium, which will be discussed in Sect. 2.2, is
Ep(h1) [ Ep(f1).
2.1 Period two: the relocation decision
Backward induction requires us to look at the firm’s decisions in period two first.
Should the firm decide to relocate, it will incur the redundancy cost of laying-off
workers in the original location and then the fixed set-up cost in the new location.
As discussed above, for relocation to occur, the condition p2(h1, f2) [ p2(h1, h2)
must hold. The profit function p2(h1, f2) is given by:
p2ðh1; f2Þ ¼ ðp2  cf Þqf2  khqh1  Uf ; ð1Þ
where ðp2  cf Þqf2 represents operating profits from producing in ‘foreign’ in period
two and khqh1 reflects the exit costs (in the form of redundancy payments) associated
7 Given the cost function, a firm will not operate from multiple production locations at the same time.
With alternative cost functions, partial relocation may occur, but the main message—employment
protection makes relocation less likely—will be preserved.
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with closing down production in ‘home’ qh2 ¼ 0
 
: Note that qh1 has been chosen
optimally in period one; so, given qh1; period two exit costs associated with leaving
the ‘home’ location increase in the employment protection parameter, kh. The
optimal period-two output produced after relocation to ‘foreign’ is obtained by
maximising Eq. (1) with respect to qf2: This implies op2ðh1; f2Þ=oqf2 ¼ 0 and yields
for the two possible states of period two demand:
qf2 ¼ ða  cf Þ=2b if p2 ¼ a  bq2 ð2aÞ
ða  cf þ eÞ=2b if p2 ¼ a  bq2 þ e ð2bÞ
Clearly, the larger the positive demand shock, the higher the output level and hence
the operating profit ðp2  cf Þqf2:
The alternative to relocating to ‘foreign’ is staying at ‘home’. Profits from
maintaining production at ‘home’ in t = 2 are given by:
p2ðh1; h2Þ ¼ ðp2  chÞqh2  Ikhðqh1  qh2Þ ð3Þ
where I is an indicator variable with I = 1 if qh12
h and I = 0 otherwise. Note that the
fixed costs associated with setting up a plant in ‘home’ have already been paid in
t = 1 and hence do not appear in Eq. (3). The first-order condition that determines
the optimal period-two production level in the ‘‘staying-at-home alternative’’ (h1,
h2) is op2 h1; h2ð Þ=oqh2 ¼ 0; which implies for the two possible states of period-two
demand:
qh2 ¼ ða  ch þ IkhÞ=2b if p2 ¼ a  bq2 ð4aÞ
ða  ch þ e þ IkhÞ=2b if p2 ¼ a  bq2 þ e ð4bÞ
Note that, whether I = 0 or I = 1, can only be determined after the optimal period-
one output in ‘home’ ðqh1Þ has been calculated (see Sect. 2.2).
From comparing Eqs. (1) and (3), it is obvious that the relocation condition,
p2ðh1; f2Þ[ p2ðh1; h2Þ; can be met only if period-two operating profits in ‘foreign’
exceed those attainable in ‘home’—that is if ðp2  cf Þqf2 [ ðp2  chÞqh2: Hence,
relocation requires cf \ ch.
When demand in t = 2 is the same as in the previous period, the firm will a
fortiori choose the same location as in t = 1. However, when demand in period two
is booming, the firm may consider relocation. Given cf \ ch and because maximised
profits are convex in output, a positive demand shock in period two will widen the
difference between operating profits attainable in ‘foreign’ and those attainable in
‘home’.8
So, if such a positive demand shock occurs in period two, how large does it need
to be to ensure that the firm will choose to relocate from ‘home’ to ‘foreign’? Using
Eqs. (1), (2b), (3) and (4b), the relocation condition p2(h1, f2) [ p2(h1, h2) can be
written as:
8 For the same reasons, a negative demand shock in period two will narrow the difference between
operating profits attainable in ‘foreign’ and those attainable in ‘home’ and hence makes the ‘foreign’
location even less attractive in period two than in period one. Therefore, relocation will not occur when
demand in period two falls (see Appendix).
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a  cf 2 a  ch þ Ikh 2
4b
þ e c
h  Ikh  cf 
2b
[ Uf þ 1  Ið Þkhqh1 ð5Þ
Equation (5) indicates that, if the period two demand shock (e) is sufficiently high
and provided that ch - Ikh - cf is positive (which it is, as it will be shown in
Sect. 2.2 that I = 0), the difference in operating profit between the two locations,
given by the left-hand-side of the expression, will exceed the total costs incurred
from relocating to ‘foreign’—represented by the right-hand-side of the expression.
So, in our model, relocation may occur even if the level of employment protection
does not change in period two.9 However, what is important is that, given qh1; a high
level of employment protection in ‘home’ may hinder relocation. A higher level of
employment protection in ‘home’, by raising the exit costs associated with closing
down production there, implies that a higher demand shock in period two is required
for relocation to ‘foreign’ to occur. Finally, although employment protection levels
tend to be stable over time because they can only change via legislation, note that if
employment protection in h were to fall in period two, then relocation to f would be
more likely.
In sum, other things equal, relocation will be more likely to occur (i) the larger is
the positive demand shock (e), (ii) the lower is Uf (which partly reflects the cost of
FDI) and (iii) the lower is the level of employment protection in ‘home’ (kh), that
determines the exit costs associated with relocation. Other things equal, a positive
level of employment protection in ‘home’ may discourage relocation and effectively
serve as a ‘domestic anchorage’ device, thus hindering outward FDI. The anchorage
effect of employment protection will also be conceivably stronger the higher are the
FDI costs, i.e. a firm may be even more reluctant to face the occurance of the
severance costs associated with relocation in the presence of high capital mobility
barriers. Naturally, the possibility of relocation begs the question of whether the
firm, knowing that it may prefer to produce in ‘foreign’ in the period two, will want
to produce in ‘home’ in the first-period. We shall turn to this issue in the next
subsection.
2.2 Period one: the initial location decision
In order to choose ‘home’ as its initial location, the firm’s expected profit from
doing so must exceed its expected profit from producing in ‘foreign’—that is:
Ep(h1) [ Ep(f1). Note that, if the firm chooses home as its initial location, despite
the ‘home’ country’s higher marginal production cost, it must be the case that
Uh \ Uf (which will typically be the case if the cost of FDI is positive). However, in
order to determine a sufficient condition for choosing ‘home’ in period one, we need
to calculate Ep(h1)and Ep(f1).
Let us first determine the firm’s expected profits from choosing ‘home’ as its initial
location (Ep(h1)). We have Epðh1Þ ¼ ph11 þ Eph12 with ph11 ¼ ðp1  chÞqh1  Uh:
9 In fact, changes in parameters other than those related to period two demand may cause relocation to
‘foreign’ in period two. For instance, one could consider uncertainty on the cost side. If the marginal cost
of production in ‘foreign’ fell in period two with a given probability, then—for a large enough cost
reduction—relocation from ‘home’ to ‘foreign’ would be a possibility.
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Assume that condition (5) is met. Then, the firm that produces in ‘home’ in period
one will relocate to ‘foreign’ if the positive demand shock in period two occurs.
Hence, the firm’s expected period two profits, given that it produces in ‘home’ in
t = 1 and will relocate to ‘foreign’ in t = 2, if demand booms in period two are
Eph12 ¼ qph1h22 þ ð1  qÞph1f22 : The firm’s optimal period one output is obtained by
maximising total expected profit with respect to qh1; or dEp h1ð Þ=dqh1 ¼ 0;
implying:
qh1 ¼
a  ch  ð1  qÞkh  Iqkh
2b
: ð6Þ
From Eqs. (4a) and (6), it is clear that qh1\q
h
2; which implies that no redundancy
costs will be incurred (I = 0) when the firm remains at ‘home’ in period two.
Hence, Eqs. (4a) and (6) become, respectively:
qh2 ¼
a  ch
2b
and qh1 ¼
a  ch  ð1  qÞkh
2b
: ð7Þ
It is clear from the expression for qh1 in (7) that period one production in ‘home’ is
smaller the higher the degree of employment protection. Intuitively, if a firm
chooses a location with a high degree of employment protection as its initial
location, the initial size of its production plant is likely to be small, as with high kh,
the initial production level is kept relatively low in order to limit future exit costs in
the possible case of future relocation.
We now derive an expression for the firm’s expected profits when it chooses
‘foreign’ as its initial location. Total expected profit from producing in ‘foreign’ is
Epðf1Þ ¼ pf11 þ Epf12 with pf11 ¼ ðp1  cf Þqf1  Uf : If demand in period two is the
same as in period one, the firm will stay in ‘foreign’ in the next period and will a
fortiori do so when there is a boom in period two demand, since its operating profits
in ‘foreign’ will be larger than in ‘home’ given the lower marginal cost of
production in ‘foreign’. Given that the initial production location is ‘foreign’, period
two profits when producing in ‘foreign’ are p2ðf1; f2Þ ¼ ðp2  cf Þqf2: Hence, the
firm’s optimal period-two production level (implied by op2 f1; f2ð Þ=oqf2 ¼ 0)
when demand in period two is the same as in period one, is (a - cf)/2, while it is
(a - cf ? e)/2, if a demand boom occurs. Hence, expected profits in period two
from producing in ‘foreign’, given that the initial location is ‘foreign’, are
Epf12 ¼ q ðac
f Þ2
4b þ ð1  qÞ ðac
fþeÞ2
4b :
Since there is no employment protection in ‘foreign’, the firm’s optimal period
one output, obtained by maximising total expected profit with respect to qf1; is
simply given by:
qf1 ¼
a  cf
2b
ð8Þ
Using Eqs. (2b), (7) and (8) as well as the expressions for expected profits, the
condition for the firm choosing ‘home’ as its initial location (Ep(h1) [ Ep(f1))
becomes:
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Uh\q Uf  ða  c
f Þ2  ða  chÞ2
4b
" #
 ða  c
f Þ2  ½ða  chÞ  ð1  qÞkh2
4b
ð9Þ
So, the firm will—in spite of the possibility that it will relocate to ‘foreign’ in period
two—choose to produce in ‘home’ in period one, if the fixed cost associated with
setting up a plant in ‘home’ is sufficiently low. The right-hand-side of Eq. (9)
specifies the maximum value for Uh, which we will denote by Uh: Other things
equal, Uhincreases in Uf, which reflects the cost of FDI—i.e. the more costly it is to
set-up a plant in f and the more likely will the firm choose to locate in h in period
one. Ceteris paribus, Uh also decreases in kh, implying that at tighter employment
protection regulations, the value of Uh consistent with the firm choosing ‘home’ as
its initial production location will fall. In other words, a region or country with
relatively high employment protection will be less attractive, other things equal, as
an initial production location than a country with more flexible labour markets.10
To summarise, our simple theoretical model predicts that (i) firms are less likely
to locate in countries with a high degree of employment protection, (ii) firms that do
locate in countries with a high degree of employment protection will keep their
plant, at least initially, relatively small and (iii) firms located in countries with a
high degree of employment protection are less likely to relocate than those located
in countries with a low degree of employment protection. A country with a higher
employment protection will therefore be less attractive to inward FDI; once location
has occurred, however, a high level of employment protection will make relocation
less likely, thus acting as an ‘anchor’ for the domestic industry. Clearly, the
sensitivity of investment flows to employment protection will also depend on the
extent of capital market integration, i.e. on the cost of FDI, captured here by
the difference between the fixed set-up costs in the two locations. At a high FDI
cost, a high employment protection differential in favour of f will be both less
discouraging of location in h, and less encouraging relocation to f, thus
strenghtening the ‘anchoring’ effect of employment protection legislation.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section we estimate an empirical model of the determinants of outward FDI
from ‘home’ country h to partner country f using panel data for OECD countries in
order to provide empirical evidence related to the theoretical findings. While the
theoretical discussion does not yield an empirically estimable reduced form
equation it nevertheless gives clear guidance on how employment protection may
impact on outward investment.
Inspired by the theoretical discussion we propose the following empirical
specification:
10 Of course, if the firm expected that the employment protection level in h were to fall in period two,
then this would increase the attractiveness of h in period one as the firm’s initial location.
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lnðFDIhftÞ ¼ a þ c1kht þ c2ðkft  khtÞ þ c3ðkht  dhftÞ þ c4½ðkft  khtÞ  dhft
þ c5dhft þ bXt þ ehft ð5Þ
where kht is a measure of employment protection (EP) in home country h at time t,
(kft - kht) is the difference in employment protection between host and home
country and dhft measures FDI costs between h and f. Other things equal, our
theoretical analysis points to a negative relationship between (kft - kht) and the
home country’s outward investment, i.e. c2 is expected to be negative. The
coefficient c1 captures the ‘domestic anchorage’ effect described in the model and is
also expected to be negative. The theory also suggests that FDI and its sensitivity to
employment protection may depend on the level of investment costs. In order to
capture this effect, we include interaction terms of our employment protection
variables with a measure of investment cost, multiplying kht and (kft - kht) by d.
Furthermore, d is included on its own to control for differences in levels of
investment costs.
The vector X captures a number of additional covariates that have been identified
in the literature as potentially affecting the location of FDI. These are:
• the level of partner country GDP, to control for the market size of the host
economy (see Culem 1988).
• the level of home country GDP, to control for the size of the home country,
which determines the supply of FDI (Blonigen 1997).
• the average wage in the partner country, to control for differences in labour
costs across countries (see Wheeler and Mody 1992).
• measures of union density and wage coordination in the partner country, to
control for differences in unionisation and the wage bargaining structure—
institutional features of labour markets that, as suggested by the theoretical
literature (e.g. Leahy and Montagna 2000a), may influence firms’ location
decision.
The dependent variable is measured as real outward FDI stocks in US dollars; the
data are taken from the OECD’s International Investment Statistics Yearbook. Stock
data are, in our view preferable to flows as the latter are short run measures which
tend to fluctuate heavily, while the employment protection measures are likely to
adjust only in the medium or long run. Hence, differences in FDI stocks across
countries may be more likely than differences in flows to reflect inter-country
employment protection differentials.11
The level of employment protection is difficult to measure as it includes a variety
of components. We follow Go¨rg (2005) and proxy the tightness of EP using an
index of hiring and firing restrictions in a country. The index itself is constructed
from extensive surveys of managers in 59 countries conducted by the World
Economic Forum. In 1999, the Global Competitiveness Report reported that around
4,000 managers participated. In the survey, participants are asked to give a score
11 An important shortcoming of the data for the dependent variable is that it does not allow us to
distinguish new locations and relocations. Unfortunately we do not have data available that would enable
such a distinction.
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between 0 and 100 in response to a number of questions describing the overall
business climate and competitiveness of the country in which the firm operates. The
particular question for the index used here is: ‘‘Hiring and firing practices are too
restricted by government or are flexible enough’’. We transformed this index so that
the lower the index the more business friendly respondents judge these practices to
be and, hence, the lower is employment protection. The index is available to us from
1986 to 1995.12 We also provide a robustness check using a different index obtained
from the OECD.
The cost of investment (d) is a measure of the cost of capital for investments from
home to partner country. It is defined as the required pre-tax rate of return based on
the approach developed in King and Fullerton (1984).13 The investment cost variable
is also an index between 0 and 100, going from least to highest cost, as is the index
for the degree of wage coordination in the partner country. The union density
variable is defined as a country’s share of workers that are unionised.14 All of these
variables, as well as the GDP data are taken from the OECD, while data on average
wages per country are utilised from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database.15
While the OECD FDI data are in principle available to us from 1980 to 2000, the
employment protection index is only available for the period 1986–1995, thus
constraining the time dimension of our empirical analysis to this period.
Table 1 reports summary data on a country’s total inward and outward FDI
stocks and its employment protection index for 1995, the last year of the analysis.
The countries with the highest levels of employment protection among the OECD
countries are Spain and Italy. At the other end of the spectrum are Denmark,
Switzerland and the UK with very low levels of employment protection in 1995. At
first sight, these data only point to a loose connection between FDI and employment
protection. For instance, Germany shows high EP levels and relatively low inward
and outward FDI stocks, which is in line with our theory: employment protection
discourages inward FDI by reducing flexibility, but it also discourages outward FDI
due to the domestic anchorage effect. The opposite goes for Canada, where low EP
levels are correlated with high inward and outward FDI. However, the Netherlands,
a country with a fairly high employment protection level, has relatively high stocks
of both inward and outward FDI.
The nature of the relationship, however, cannot be adequately captured by these
summary data. A better appreciation of the effects of employment protection on FDI
stocks can be gained by estimating the empirical model in Eq. (5) using bilateral
data. The results of the panel estimation, allowing for country-partner fixed effects
to control for country-pair unobservable, are presented in Table 2 column (1) gives
the results for an estimation that excludes the union and wage setting variables;
these variables are added successively in columns (2) and (3). The estimations show
12 Critics may argue that such an index is likely to be subjective. However, the perceptions of the
managers of the firm as to the ‘desirability’ of a location are likely to play a crucial role in determining
their decision.
13 See OECD (1991) for a detailed description.
14 See Elmeskov et al. (1998) for a discussion of the wage coordination and unionisation variables.
15 All nominal variables are converted into real 1995 US dollars.
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that the expected positive effect of the home and partner country market sizes on
FDI is accurately reflected in the data. We also find a statistically significant
negative coefficient on the average wage, in line with our priors. Again consistently
with the received wisdom, a higher percentage of unionised workers in a country is
negatively associated with inward FDI, as is our indicator of the degree of wage
coordination in the partner country.
Turning to the employment protection variables, we firstly focus on the results in
columns (1) to (3) where we estimated the model described in Eq. (5) excluding the
interaction terms for c3 and c4. We find that a higher employment protection
differential between the partner and the home country is negatively correlated with
bilateral FDI stocks from home to ‘foreign’. The fact that an employment protection
differential in favour of the home country discourages outward FDI to the partner
country is in line with our theoretical predictions and reflects the latter’s relatively
Table 1 FDI and employment protection, 1995
Outward Stocks Inward Stocks EP
Australia 0.114 0.231 53.7
Austria 0.042 0.069 53.7
Belgium 0.209 0.452 64.6
Canada 0.159 0.200 39.0
Czech Republic 42.6
Denmark 19.6
Finland 0.107 0.062 54.2
France 0.099 0.091 59.2
Germany 0.094 0.076 58.2
Greece 0.000 0.003 56.7
Hungary 0.003 0.221 34.4
Iceland 0.024 0.024 30.6
Ireland 0.166 0.643 48.3
Italy 0.071 0.051 72.0
Japan 40.8
Mexico 0.007 0.130 47.4
Netherlands 0.373 0.262 63.4
New Zealand 0.122 0.371 29.3
Norway 0.140 0.125 53.0
Poland 0.001 0.060 43.5
Portugal 0.022 0.141 59.6
Spain 0.019 0.085 70.6
Sweden 0.232 0.114 61.4
Switzerland 0.364 0.177 22.1
Turkey 0.003 0.019 28.7
UK 0.223 0.172 27.1
USA 0.069 0.067 33.8
Reports FDI stocks divided by GDP
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lower labour market flexibility. We also find evidence that supports our conjecture of a
domestic anchorage effect, as the level of employment protection in the home country
is also negatively related to outward FDI. The expected negative impact of investment
costs on FDI is only reflected in our data in the ‘fully specified’ model in column (3).
Column (4) report results of estimations including the interaction terms of the
employment protection variables with investment costs.16 From our theoretical model
we would expect negative coefficients on these terms, since the responsiveness of FDI
flows to both a higher flexibility differential in favour of the home country and a higher
level of home employment protection is likely to be higher (i.e. more negative) the
larger is the investment cost (i.e. the lower the degree of capital market integration).
We find that the interaction of home EP and investment costs is negative, yet
statistically insignificant, while the interaction of the EP differential and investment
cost is positive. While this is not fully in line with our theoretical predictions, the
positive coefficient could be intuitively plausible and suggests that as investment costs
rises, the deterring effect of the EP differential becomes less important for investors.
The results obtained from this analysis of the determinants of FDI stocks are thus
broadly in line with our priors from the theoretical model. In order to examine the
Table 2 Regression results for outward FDI stocks (Dependent variable: ln FDI stocks from home to
partner)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partner GDP 1.948 (0.102)*** 1.741 (0.128)*** 1.581 (0.128)*** 1.497 (0.130)***
Home GDP 2.215 (0.095)*** 2.373 (0.128)*** 2.256 (0.127)*** 2.189 (0.127)***
Partner labour cost -1.313 (0.078)*** -1.350 (0.149)*** -1.060 (0.149)*** -0.932 (0.151)***
Home EP -0.021 (0.004)*** -0.012 (0.004)*** -0.011 (0.004)*** -0.010 (0.004)***
EP differential -0.007 (0.002)*** -0.006 (0.002)*** -0.002 (0.002) -0.009 (0.003)***
Investment cost 0.930 (0.244)*** -0.270 (0.287) -0.686 (0.296)** -0.338 (0.379)
Union density -1.355 (0.097)*** -1.354 (0.098)*** -1.359 (0.097)***
Wage coordination
index
-0.005 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.001)***
Home EP 9
investment cost
-0.003 (0.002)
EP diff. 9
investment cost
0.011 (0.002)***
Observations 2,491 2,201 2,201 2,201
R2 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91
Regression with country-partner fixed effects
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regression includes constant term
16 While the investment cost variable is defined as an index, the interaction terms are based on a dummy
equal to 1 if investment costs are higher than the median. In preliminary regressions we also interacted the
EP variables with the actual level of investment costs. However, this produced unsatisfactory results and
is not pursued here. This suggests that there are important non-linearities in the relationship between EP
and investment costs which are better captured by the dummy variable.
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robustness of our estimations we present two extensions to the analysis. The
empirical analysis carried out thus far considers EP as an exogenous variable in the
estimation, i.e. it takes it to be unrelated with the error term. We now relax this
assumption, and endogenise the employment protection variable by estimating
Eq. (5) using third and fourth lags of the EP variables as instruments. This model is
estimated using a GMM estimator as suggested by Baum et al. (2003).17 Table 3
presents the estimation results. We find that the coefficients on home EP and the EP
differential are both negative and statistically significant as found before. While we
find that the coefficient on investment costs is now also negative and significant, as
predicted by the theory, the coefficients on the interaction terms are now in both
cases statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, this estimation provides broad support
for our theoretical prediction of home EP and the EP differential having negative
effects on outward FDI, and points to the robustness of the results obtained in
Table 2.
Another possible concern with our analysis thus far is the measurement of
employment protection based on the index from the Global Competitiveness Report
(GCR). Given the qualitative nature of this index, it is relevant to try to ascertain the
robustness of our results to alternative measurements of EP. To this end, we use an
alternative index of employment protection provided to us by the OECD. This index
is based on measures of protection affecting the country’s temporary and regular
employment. More specifically, the indicator is constructed ‘‘based on an in-depth
Table 3 GMM Regression results (Dependent variable: ln FDI stocks from home to partner)
(1) (2)
Partner GDP 0.445 (0.061)*** 0.439 (0.060)***
Home GDP 1.002 (0.036)*** 1.009 (0.037)***
Partner labour cost -1.012 (0.325)*** -0.950 (0.328)***
Home EP -0.040 (0.008)*** -0.036 (0.009)***
EP differential -0.016 (0.006)*** -0.022 (0.007)***
Investment cost -5.817 (0.448)*** -4.439 (1.035)***
Union density -0.884 (0.156)*** -0.899 (0.159)***
Wage coordination index -0.006 (0.002)*** -0.006 (0.002)***
Home EP 9 investment cost -0.009 (0.007)
EP diff. 9 investment cost 0.010 (0.008)
Hansen test (p-value) 0.13 0.37
R-squared 0.42 0.42
Observations 1,392 1,392
EP variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments used are third and fourth lags of variables
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regression includes constant term
17 The GMM estimator is preferable to a standard IV estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Our
estimations suggest that first and second lags are not valid instruments and hence use third and fourth lags.
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review of existing regulations and laws affecting the hiring and firing of workers
along the two dimensions of regular and temporary contracts’’ (Nicoletti et al. 1999,
pp. 40–41). As with the GCR index used in our analysis, the OECD index takes on
values between 0 and 100 from the least to the most restrictive.
Unfortunately, this index is only available for 1989 and 1998, thus thwarting its
use in a panel context. Nevertheless, we can compare the Global Competitiveness
Report (GCR) and OECD indices for 1989. For that year, the raw correlation of the
indices is 0.69, statistically significant at the 1 per cent level—a fairly high level of
correlation. To conduct a further check of the robustness of our results, we re-
estimate Eq. (5) using cross-section data for 1989 and making alternative use of the
GCR and OECD indices as measures of home EP and EP differential.18 The results
are reported in Table 4. Note that the results are strikingly similar to those obtained
with the panel estimation—home EP and EP differential are negative and statistically
significant, while the interaction terms are statistically insignificant in both cases.19
Table 4 Cross section regression comparing GCR and OECD index (Dependent variable: ln FDI stocks
from home to partner)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GCR index GCR index OECD index OECD index
Partner GDP 0.485 (0.194)** 0.497 (0.196)** 0.638 (0.170)*** 0.651 (0.168)***
Home GDP 0.970 (0.121)*** 0.977 (0.123)*** 1.134 (0.098)*** 1.157 (0.100)***
Partner labour cost -1.373 (0.641)** -1.340 (0.634)** -1.241 (0.579)** -1.195 (0.566)**
Home EP -0.093 (0.022)*** -0.090 (0.022)*** -0.029 (0.009)*** -0.016 (0.012)
EP differential -0.049 (0.016)*** -0.053 (0.017)*** -0.021 (0.007)*** -0.021 (0.008)***
Investment cost -2.166 (1.146)* -1.417 (1.514) -3.466 (1.115)*** -1.429 (1.535)
Union density -0.800 (0.384)** -0.811 (0.404)** -0.940 (0.325)*** -0.964 (0.342)***
Wage coordination
index
0.000 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) -0.000 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004)
Home EP 9
Investment cost
-0.006 (0.009) -0.018 (0.011)
EP diff. 9
Investment cost
0.009 (0.013) 0.003 (0.008)
Observations 211 211 207 207
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51
Cross-section OLS regression for 1989
Raw correlation between GCR and OECD index = 0.69, statistically significant at 1% level Hetero-
scedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
Regression includes constant term
18 Of course, the coefficients obtained from these estimations need to be treated with caution as they may
be biased due to excluding country-partner unobservable. However, this bias works in the same direction
for all estimations and still allows us to check whether there are differences in using the GCR or OECD
indices.
19 The magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat different. This is to be expected as the absolute values
of the indices are not comparable. What we are interested in is the variation in the indices, however.
FDI, employment protection and domestic anchorage 107
123
4 Conclusions
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the empirical results of this paper
suggest that: firstly, domestic levels of employment protection discourage outward
FDI and act as an ‘anchorage’ device for domestic industry, and secondly,
employment protection differentials between foreign and home country are
negatively related to FDI outflows.
Overall, the theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper suggests that the
relationship between labour market rigidities and international investment flows is
more complex than what is implied by the conventional wisdom. Some tentative but
interesting policy conclusions can be drawn from our results. Given that
employment protection can help to anchor domestic industry by discouraging
relocation, industrialised countries with a large industrial base will be able to sustain
high levels of firing costs. Developing countries with a small industrial base may
instead have an incentive to pursue flexible labour market policies. More generally,
this analysis points to the theoretical possibility of a strategic inter-temporal use of
labour standards, whereby low employment protection could be used to attract
inward investment to a given location and could then be subsequently raised to lock
the investment in.20
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Appendix
In this appendix, we extend the basic model developed in the text by incorporating
the possibility of a negative demand shock. Now, there are three possible states for
period two demand: with probability q, demand in t = 2 is the same as in t = 1;
with probability h period-two demand will fall, i.e. p2 = a - bq2 - g, with g (a
constant parameter) denoting the fall in demand; the probability that demand in the
period two will boom is now 1 - q - h.
(i) Period two: the relocation decision
Equations (1)–(4b) remain valid, but we now have an additional expression for qf2
and for qh2 in the third possible state of period two demand, with:
qf2 ¼ ða  cf  gÞ=2b if p2 ¼ a  bq2  g ðA:1aÞ
and
qh2 ¼ ða  ch  g þ IhkhÞ=2b if p2 ¼ a  bq2  g ðA:1bÞ
Ih is an indicator variable with Ih = 1 if q
h
1 [ q
h
2 p2¼abq2g
 and Ih = 0 otherwise.
When demand in t = 2 is the same as in t = 1, the firm will choose the same
20 See Leahy and Montagna (2000b) for a theoretical analysis of the strategic use of unionisation laws.
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location in t = 2 as in t = 1; hence, no relocation will occur in that case. So, if
period two demand is lower than demand in period one, the monopolist will a
fortiori choose the same location as in period one (since maximised profits are
convex in output). Therefore, relocation will only occur if the demand shock in
period two is a positive one and hence Eq. (5) remains valid and is not altered by the
possibility of a negative period two demand shock. Of course, the probability that
relocation will happen is now 1 - q - h instead of 1 - q.
(ii) Period one: the initial location decision
We first calculate Ep(h1). When choosing qh1; the firm maximises Epðh1Þ ¼
ph1 þ Eph12 ; but now Eph12 ¼ qph1h22 p2¼abq2
 þ hph1h22 p2¼abq2g
 þ ð1  q  hÞph1f22 :
The firm’s optimal period one output, qh1; is now:
qh1 ¼
a  ch  ð1  q  hÞkh  Iqkh  Ihhkh
2b
ðA:2Þ
From Eqs. (4a) and (6), it is clear that qh1\q
h
2 if p2 ¼ a  bq2; hence I = 0.
However, if p2 ¼ a  bq2  g; qh1 [ qh2 is possible, in which case Ih = 1 (from
Eqs. 7, 8), if the negative shock is large enough. More specifically, Ih = 1 when
g[ ð2  qÞkh:21 Then,
qh1 ¼
a  ch  ð1  q  hÞkh  hkh
2b
and qh2 ¼ ða  ch  g þ kh=2b: ðA:3Þ
We now derive an expression for Ep(f1). We have Epðf1Þ ¼ pf1 þ Epf12 ; with Epf12 ¼
q ðac
f Þ2
4b þ h ðac
fgÞ2
4b þ ð1  q  hÞ ðac
fþeÞ2
4b : The expression for q
f
1 is given by Eq.
(8). Using expressions (2b), (8) and (9) as well as the expressions for expected
profits, the condition for the firm choosing ‘home’ as its initial location
(Ep(h1) [ Ep(f1)) is now
22:
Uh\ðq þ hÞUfq ða  c
f Þ2  ða  chÞ2
4b
" #
 ða  c
f Þ2  ½ða  chÞ  ð1  q  hÞkh  hkh2
4b
 h ða  c
f  gÞ2  ða  ch  g þ khÞ2
4b
¼ Uh
ðA:4Þ
We have dUh=dkh ¼ ð1qÞðachð1qhÞkhhkhÞþhðachgþkhÞ
2b \0 (since g[ (2 -
q)kh). Hence, like in the basic model, we obtain that Uh is lower for higher values of
kh.
21 If the negative shock is small enough, Eq. (A.1b) and (A.2) show that qh1\q
h
2 and hence Ih = 0,
without making any qualitative changes to our analysis.
22 If g is small enough so that qh1\q
h
2; then Ih = 0 and
Uh ¼ ðq þ hÞUf  q ðacf Þ2ðachÞ2
4b
h i

ðacf Þ2½ðachÞð1qhÞkh 2
4b with, once again, d
Uh=dkh\0:
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